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Abstract
This paper discusses the way that dierent operational characteristics including ex-
isting capacity, scale economies, and production policy have an important inuence on
the capacity outcomes when rms compete in the market place. We formulate a game-
theoretical model where each rm has an existing capacity and faces both xed and
variable costs in purchasing additional capacity. Specically, the rms simultaneously (or
sequentially) make their expansion decisions, and then simultaneously decide their pro-
duction decisions with these outputs being capacity constrained. We also compare our
results with cases where production has to match capacity. By characterizing the rms'
capacity and production choices in equilibrium, our analysis shows that the operational
factors play a crucial role in determining what happens. The modeling and analysis in the
paper gives insight into the way that the ability to use less production capacity than has
been built will undermine the commitment value of existing capacity. If a commitment to
full production is not possible, sinking operational costs can enable a rm to keep some
preemptive advantage. We also show that the existence of xed costs can introduce cases
where there are either no pure strategy equilibrium or multiple equilibria. The manage-
rial implications of our analysis are noted in the discussion. Our central contribution in
this paper is the innovative integration of the strategic analysis of capacity expansion and
well-known (s; S) policy in operations and supply chain theory.
Keywords: capacity expansion; existing capacity; xed cost; lead time; game theory;
competitive strategy
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to increase our understanding of how the competitive asymmetries
between existing capacities and between investment/production costs aect rm capacity decisions.
When a rm faces a challenge from a competitor who can introduce new capacity (either an incumbent
rm with existing capacity or a potential entrant), it can be hard to decide whether to respond
aggressively to rivals through adding capacity (Hayes et al., 2005). The rm needs to make a trade-
o: making no response or making too small a capacity addition will result in accommodating the
Corresponding Author.
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rival, while making too large a capacity addition will result in unused capacity or depressed prices.
Furthermore, capacity decisions aect most, if not all, other operating decisions including production
planning and inventory levels, human resource decisions, and decisions on logistics and distribution
(Hendricks et al., 1995). So capacity response in a competitive environment is a crucial operations
challenge with a signicant impact on rm protability. An important feature of this paper is that
the combined impact of existing capacities and xed costs of investment is considered in our formal
analysis. Thus we can shed light on the means by which ex ante asymmetries in operational factors
can inuence the rm decision on responding to its rival's capacity expansion.
1.1 Background
There are two linked ideas that are important in understanding strategic capacity decisions. First,
there is the notion that capacity can be accumulated. A rm may have some pre-existing capacity
which is then added to by further investment. The second idea is that capacity acts as a constraint on
production. Indeed, a rm's capacity is often dened as its maximum production rate. But research
on competitive capacity investment has often dropped the second of these ideas: while maintaining
the idea of accumulation, problems of analytic tractability have frequently led researchers to assume
that a rm makes decisions on production and capacity at the same time (e.g., Anand and Girotra,
2007; Goyal and Netessine, 2007; Swinney et al., 2011). This leads to a clearance strategy in which
a rm will use all of its capacity in production even if this turns out to be to its disadvantage. In
our view this is only an appropriate model in cases where a rm has no option to make production
decisions before discovering its rival's capacity choices (such as may occur if there are long lead times
for major components); or, needs to maintain high capacity utilization because of high xed costs of
starting and stopping the production process; or, has available some mechanism to make a credible
full production commitment to preempt the market (Hayes et al., 2005). Hence even though we use
the terminology of a clearance strategy, as is normal in the operations management literature (see Van
Mieghem and Dada, 1999), we do not mean to imply that a rm necessarily makes a choice about
the strategy to use. It is more likely that a clearance strategy is a consequence of industry structure
(Lieberman, 1987b; Goyal and Netessine, 2007).
In many circumstances rms rst invest in capacity through building a factory or production
line, and then operate the production facility over a period of months or years. When decisions
on production quantities are made at a later time, it is often not possible to commit to a certain
production level at the time when the capacity investment is made. In such cases rms may well
choose to produce at a lower level than their maximum capacity (Hayes et al., 2005) and we refer
to this as a holdback strategy following the operations management literature (see Van Mieghem
and Dada, 1999). Note that we view the production policy, either holdback or clearance, as a xed
characteristic of the industry, but in practice the situation can be more complicated as rms need
to make adjustments over time in response to market conditions. For instance in semiconductor
manufacturing a rm may need to cut production when demand levels are falling, since if it sells all
its capacity to the marketplace the resulting surplus production can push prices even lower (Wu et
al., 2005). In this case the degree to which holdback is employed is a function of changing market
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conditions which are unknown at the outset. However, in this paper we concentrate on the simplest
case in which a production quantity is set only once (following the operations literature including
Anupindi and Jiang (2008)) and uncertainty in market conditions is suciently small that it can be
ignored (following the economics literature including Dixit (1980)).
We will assume full information and in this case a rm can deduce its competitor's capacity
investment decisions at the time that it makes its own investment. Thus no further information
becomes available and there is nothing to stop a production decision being made at the time of
investment (as occurs for example in Rhim et al. (2003)). But holdback production simply reects
the common circumstance that there is no mechanism for commitment to such a production decision in
advance (Chen et al., 2002; Hayes et al., 2005). It is unclear in the literature whether, with holdback
production, there might be a situation where in equilibrium a rm invests in capacity and this is
not used. For example we might guess that when an aggressive large investment can ensure that a
competitor will not invest, then this may lead to an equilibrium solution where the investing rm ends
with more capacity than is needed. Our detailed analysis will show that this never happens in the
holdback setting. Nevertheless using holdback will result in dierent equilibrium outcomes than the
clearance case when only one of the rms invests.
The history of Du Pont ghting with Kerr-McGee in the U.S. bulk chemical industry (see Ghe-
mawat, 1984) illustrates the fact that lead time is important in strategic capacity investment. In this
case, the challenger in the industry, Kerr-McGee, announced its own capacity investment plan before
the expansion of the incumbent, Du Pont, had fully materialized. The presence of signicant lead
time for adding capacity provided Kerr-McGee with the ability to force its competitor, Du Pont, to
revise its initial capacity plan. This strategic response to a capacity expansion announcement meant
that Du Pont was unable to increase its market share and allowed Kerr-McGee to avoid being in the
strategically disadvantaged position of investment follower. This case shows that given the long lead
time involved in capacity expansion, neither rm can move fast enough to establish a leader-follower
environment. Koeva (2000) indicates that average lead time for signicant capacity investments is 26
months for a range of 23 industries including utilities, chemical plants, and rubber processing plants.
Thus, when there is a long lead time, capacity investment is best considered as a simultaneous move
competition rather than a sequential move competition.
There is often a signicant xed cost that is incurred in capacity expansion in capital-intensive
sectors for line production and process industries such as semiconductors, petrochemicals and at-
panel-monitor manufacturing, where production capacity is expensive and can take a long time to
build (Hayes et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2005). In an empirical study of the U.S. petroleum rening
industry, Asano (2002) shows that the size of xed cost of investment is important to rms' investment
decisions regardless of rm size. From the point of view of capacity strategy, we might expect that a
xed cost will raise a hurdle against small levels of investment and may make it easier for an incumbent
to deter a new entrant by building excess capacity (e.g., Rhim et al., 2003).
In this paper, we will try to unravel the impact of a number of dierent operational factors
mentioned above that can play a part in determining the outcomes of competitive capacity expansion.
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1.2 Summary of Analysis
We propose a game-theoretical model explicitly addressing the four factors we have mentioned: existing
capacity, lead time, production policy, and investment xed costs. Our work diers from the majority
of papers in this area by explicitly considering the ex-ante asymmetries that exist in both existing
capacities and investment costs.
By including a pre-existing capacity endowment for the two rms we are able to model both cases
with an incumbent and an entrant. We will give a complete analysis including situations where one of
the rms has a capacity endowment which is larger than would be optimal. This may happen when
the game we analyze comes after some decisions on preliminary investment that are made with an
uncertain forecast of the market size. Thus our model can be useful in analyzing the later stages
of a more extended strategic competition with uncertainty at the rst stage about nal demand.
Specically, we are able to discuss a situation in which an incumbent rm has already taken the
opportunity to build or buy additional capacity prior to an entering rm deciding on its capacity
investment. In this environment an incumbent rm can still take the opportunity to build more
capacity at the same time as the entering rm and our model is designed to reect this.
We model a duopoly where each rm decides to invest (INV ) or not to invest (NI ), and then
chooses its capacity expansion level if it selects the INV strategy. The two rms produce the same or
perfectly substitutable product; they both have access to the same deterministic forecast of demand;
and, at the production stage, they know the capacity level of the other rm. Thus, after the capacity
investment decisions have been made (the capacity game), the rms can evaluate their prot in a
capacity-constrained production game. The market price is a function of the total production amount
oered to the market by the two rms, and the production policy available to each rm (holdback or
clearance) is xed according to the industry structure.
We rst characterize the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the production game and develop a
best response function for each rm, given the capacity of its competitor, as a function of the initial
capacities, the investment and operational costs, and the market structure parameters. Then, given
plausible assumptions that the variable cost of capacity is not too high, we characterize the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium in the capacity game with simultaneous decisions. The equilibrium outcome
in the alternating decision scheme is developed later for the sake of comparison. In the simultaneous
decision setting, we show that all the various equilibrium possibilities can arise depending on the
magnitude of existing capacity, even when other problem parameters are xed. In this paper we
will spend most time giving a thorough analysis of the problem with xed costs, production holdback
strategies, and simultaneous capacity decisions. This is the most dicult case to analyze and has been
neglected in the literature up to now: arguably, this is the case that occurs most often in practice (see
Hayes et al., 2005).
The lead time determines whether the appropriate model is one where the rms move simultane-
ously or where they move sequentially. Sequential capacity decisions can only occur when the lead
time (i.e., the time required to make a rm commitment on capacity) is short enough so that one rm
can act prior to its competitor making a capacity decision. In any other case it is better to model the
game using simultaneous capacity decisions.
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1.3 Related Literature
The operations literature on competitive capacity expansion is not very extensive, since most attention
has been focused on the monopoly setting: see Van Mieghem (2003) for a comprehensive survey. The
majority of capacity expansion models with a single rm have given explicit consideration to xed costs
in order to demonstrate economies of scale in operations (e.g., Ye and Duenyas, 2007). However, most
oligopoly models in this research stream ignore the existence of xed costs in order to obtain analytical
results (e.g., Anand and Girotra, 2007; Goyal and Netessine, 2007). For example, Van Mieghem and
Dada (1999) consider several rms that produce the same product and face a linear demand curve
with a stochastic intercept. Each of the rms has to decide on its capacity, production quantity, and
price. They show that the price, capacity, inventory, and prot are increasing in demand variability.
They consider rms that all employ holdback in production, but their results rely on rm symmetry
to nd a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies for capacity competition. We complement this
stream of research by incorporating xed costs into a competitive capacity model without assuming
that rms are symmetric (see, e.g., Chevalier-Roignant et al., 2011).
We will analyze duopoly models where two rms, with or without existing capacities, strategically
invest in capacity in the presence of xed costs and lead time. Similar models, frequently referred to as
\commitment (entry) games" in the industrial organization (IO) literature, use deterministic demand
and sunk/xed costs in order to explain whether or not strategic excess capacity can be built either to
deter new entry or to preempt existing rivals (e.g., Spulber, 1981). The entry-deterrence argument is
that existing excess capacity enables incumbents to threaten to expand output and cut prices following
entry, thereby making entry unprotable. Hence, deterrence is achieved by intensifying the post-entry
competition anticipated by the entrant. This strategic preemption increases the rst mover's prot
but lowers overall industry prot through this excess industry capacity (Dearden et al., 1999). Most
IO models assume that rms use all of their available capacity (i.e., exercise clearance in production)
even if the market-clearing price is below their variable costs. This assumption allows the interactions
of rms' best response functions to be greatly simplied. However, Dixit (1980) and Ware (1984) point
out that the pre-commitment is generally not perfect. While the investment decision is irrevocable,
the capacity having been invested will be used only if it is protable to do so (Krishnan and Roller,
1993). In other words, when competing rms can employ holdback in production then it becomes
much harder to use a preemptive capacity expansion to deter an entrant. Our paper complements
existing IO research by considering a simultaneous move game and allowing each rm to have some
existing capacity; this allows a better match to situations that are prevalent in practice.
2 Model Description
There are two rms indexed i = 1; 2 in a duopoly: the rms are prot maximizers and risk neutral.
This is a two-stage sequential game: specically, investments are made in the rst period (the capacity
game) and production decisions are made in the second period (the production game). At the second
stage a rm's output is subject to its capacity constraint: this is its initial capacity endowment plus
any additional capacity arising from the investment in the rst stage. We only consider the prots
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made from decisions on capacity investment in period 1 and production in period 2; so we ignore any
production activity that takes place prior to period 2 using pre-existing capacity. Throughout this
paper, we assume that all information is common knowledge.
In period 1, each rm can decide to either keep the same capacity level as the existing capacity
amount (NI ), or increase capacity over the existing capacity amount (INV ). At the start of the game,
rm i's pre-existing capacity is zi and its capacity level after making the investment decision is denoted
by xi. Thus xi  zi  0 and xi   zi is the capacity addition for rm i. Capacity investment is costly
and we suppose that there is a xed cost of Ki incurred in choosing the INV strategy. Investment is
irreversible.
We assume that neither rm can delay its investment decision until it discovers the investment
decision of the other; that is, any delay between the two rms' investment decision is sucient small
so that the rst stage can be considered simultaneous. In period 2, the rms simultaneously decide
their production quantities (denoted by yi  0) given their investment decisions in period 1. Note that
production will usually take place over a long period; and thus the two periods are typically of very
dierent lengths. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of our model. In Section 6 we will briey discuss
an alternating investment decision scheme, where the rst stage is a sequential-move noncooperative
game and the second stage remains as a simultaneous-move noncooperative game.
Figure 1: The Sequence of Events
A rm's total cost is made up of two parts. First, a capacity decision xi   zi > 0 for rm i incurs
an investment cost Ki +Wi (xi   zi) ; where Wi is the cost per unit of investment (and there is zero
cost if there is no investment and xi = zi). Second, the production decision yi 2 [0; xi] for rm i
involves an operational cost Viyi, where Vi is the cost per unit of production.
The inverse demand curve is deterministic and linear, and we can always scale units such that the
price is given by P (Q) = A Q; where Q  0 is the total supply put into the market by the two rms
and the demand intercept A is a positive constant. It has been argued that this model with rms
competing in quantities (Cournot competition) is appropriate for the description of the medium to
long-term equilibrium in a spot market (see Tirole, 1988). Within a capacity constrained environment
even allowing Bertrand type price competition can lead to a Cournot competition at the point of
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capacity investment (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983). In the same way Anupindi and Jiang (2008)
have suggested that price competition can also be modeled in this way if rms have some exibility
to exercise control on quantity through production or delivery. Due to its analytical simplicity, the
choice of linear demand is conventional and this is often a good approximation to more general demand
functions (see Shapiro, 1986). A downward sloping linear inverse demand curve can also be thought of
as the result of utility-maximizing behavior of customers with quadratic, additively separable utility
functions (see Singh and Vives, 1984).
In the online supplementary material, we give the proofs that are not reported in the paper.
3 Production Game with Holdback
We begin with the production game. Suppose that rms have already played the rst stage capacity
game, and are endowed with capacities xi and xj . In this second stage, the rms play a constrained
quantity-setting game.
Upon observing the capacities (xi; xj) and conjecturing rm j's output of yj , rm i solves the
following decision problem:
i (xi; xj) = max
yi2[0;xi]
fP (yi + yj) yi   Viyig ;
where the objective function is the operating prot of rm i in period 2 and P (yi + yj) = A  yi  yj .
Note that we do not include any discounting of the prots in this formulation, though a model
with discounted cash ows can be converted into the form we give here with suitable changes in the
parameters and units of quantity. The decision variable yi must lie in [0; xi] which is the feasible set
of outputs given that rm i employs holdback (if clearance is used then yi = xi). This yields the
rst-order optimality condition:
@ [P (yi + yj) yi   Viyi]
@yi
= A  2yi   yj   Vi = 0,
and we can check that the second-order optimality conditions are satised. Solving for yi as a function
of yj gives the best response of rm i in production:
yai (yj) :=
A  Vi   yj
2
.
Without capacity constraints, the Nash equilibrium outcome in the production game can be calculated
by solving the two best responses, yai () and yaj (), simultaneously. To do this, we need an assumption:
Assumption 1. A  2Vi + Vj > 0 for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i.
Then we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1 and given innite capacity for the two rms, the unique Nash equi-
librium in the production game is

yci ; y
c
j

where
yci 
A  2Vi + Vj
3
for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i.
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Assumption 1 is needed in order to ensure that yc1 and y
c
2 are positive. Note that @
2i

@y2i =
 2 < 0 and @i/ (@yi@yj) =  1 < 0 for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i, so the equilibrium output

yci ; y
c
j

is
unique. This assumption is commonly adopted in the analytical literature to ensure that the marginal
cost of production and operations is lower than expected maximum price (i.e., A) and both rms have
an incentive to sell positive quantities of their products in the market (see, e.g., Tirole, 1988). It also
rules out the trivial case wherein it is never protable to produce and sell products. In fact, many
analytical operations management studies implicitly make this assumption by scaling production costs
to zero (e.g., Anand and Girotra, 2007; Goyal and Netessine, 2007; Swinney et al., 2011).
If both rms' capacities exceed the equilibrium outputs (i.e., xi  yci for i = 1; 2), the unique
second-stage equilibrium in the production game is given by (yc1; y
c
2). If xi < y
c
i and xj < y
c
j , the
unique equilibrium in the production game is given by (x1; x2). This is because given that yj = xj ,
the best response of rm i's output, yai (xj), is larger than rm i's capacity constraint of xi, and a
symmetric result holds for rm j. In the asymmetric case where xi  yci but xj < ycj , the equilibrium
in production is described by the following result.
Lemma 2. When xi  yci and xj < ycj , where i = 1; 2 and j 6= i, the Nash equilibrium in the
production game is (min [xi; y
a
i (xj)] ; xj).
Proof. Given yj ; the operating prot function for rm i, P (yi + yj) yi   Viyi, is quadratic with a
maximum at yai (yj). Hence, given a capacity constraint yi  xi for rm i; the best response is yi =
min [xi; y
a
i (yj)]. So yi = min [xi; y
a
i (xj)] is the best response to yj = xj . To show a Nash equilibrium,
it only remains to prove that yj = xj is the best response to yi = min [xi; y
a
i (xj)]. Due to the fact
that yi  yai (xj) we know that 2yi  A   Vi   xj and xj < ycj implies 3xj < A   2Vj + Vi. Adding
these inequalities we have 2yi < 2A   2Vj  4xj . Rearranging this gives xj < yaj (yi) which in turn
establishes yj = xj as required. 
Figure 2 maps the rst-stage capacity choices onto the second-stage equilibrium output choices,
according to Lemmas 1 and 2. The combination of capacity levels gives rise to four possible outcomes
of the production game. The four regions identied in the gure are dened as follows:
0 
n
(xi; xj)
 0  xi < yai (xj) and 0  xj < yaj (xi)o
4 
n
(xi; xj)
 0  xi < yci and xj  yaj (xi)o ,
5 
n
(xi; xj)
xi  yai (xj) and 0  xj < ycj o ,
6 
n
(xi; xj)
xi  yci and xj  ycj o .
The numbering here arises because of the further sets 1, 2 and 3 used in the proof of Theorem 1
and dened in the online supplementary material. We can summarize our results for the production
game under holdback production as follows.
Lemma 3. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. The equilibrium behavior in the production holdback
game is:
(i) if (xi; xj) 2 0, the equilibrium outputs are xi and xj;
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Figure 2: Mapping of Capacity onto Production Equilibrium
(ii) if (xi; xj) 2 4, the equilibrium outputs are xi and yaj (xi);
(iii) if (xi; xj) 2 5, the equilibrium outputs are yai (xj) and xj;
(iv) if (xi; xj) 2 6, the equilibrium outputs are yci and ycj .
This result is similar to Eaton and Ware (1987) and Krishnan and Roller (1993), but under dierent
cost functions for investment and production activities.
4 Best Response in Capacity Game
Now we are ready to consider the choice of capacity investment at the rst stage. In order to simplify
the problem, we strengthen Assumption 1 to give:
Assumption 2. A  2Vi + Vj > 6Wi for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i.
We can write this assumption as yci > 2Wi for i = 1; 2. This is an assumption that will be satised in
most situations unless the market is very price inelastic and the variable cost of additional capacity
is high. It is possible to derive best response functions without making this assumption, but it gives
rise to a large number of cases and it is still necessary to make some other assumptions to derive an
analytical solution to the capacity game. By introducing this assumption, we can avoid trivialities
that capacity levels after the investment are less than the equilibrium outcomes in the production
game. As for Assumption 1, this assumption and its variants have been implicitly imposed in many
analytical capacity-related studies to ensure that capacity investment is still protable even if both
rms expand their capacity levels at the same time, see Section 5 for the details.
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Given rm j's capacity choice of xj , rm i's operating prot function can be derived from Lemma
3:
i (xi; xj) = P (xi + xj)xi   Vixi if (xi; xj) 2 0,
= P

xi + y
a
j (xi)

xi   Vixi if (xi; xj) 2 4,
= P (yai (xj) + xj) y
a
i (xj)  Viyai (xj) if (xi; xj) 2 5,
= P

yci + y
c
j

yci   Viyci if (xi; xj) 2 6.
Let
Ri (xi; xj) := i (xi; xj) Wi (xi   zi) Ki
be the prot of rm i, net of investment and production costs. Observing the existing capacity pair
(zi; zj) and conjecturing rm j's capacity choice of xj , rm i's optimal prot at the investment stage
is
i (zi; xj) =
(
i (zi; xj) if i (zi; xj)  Ri (xi ; xj) ;
Ri (x

i ; xj) otherwise,
where xi is the maximizer of function Ri (xi; xj) subject to xi > zi with the given xj . The equation
for i shows that given zi and xj , rm i invests up to x

i if the return from this investment is over
the investment expense; otherwise, the rm does not invest. From this observation, we can expect
that the best response of rm i's investment to its rival's decision xj will depend on some threshold.
If rm i's existing capacity zi is above the threshold, then its prot without investing is high enough
and it should not build any new capacity; if not, it should build an additional amount of capacity
xi   zi. However, we can be certain of this behavior only if the prot function i (zi; xj) is monotonic
in zi for the range 0  zi  xi corresponding to Ri (; xj) being unimodal. In our case it turns out
that the functions involved may not be unimodal. Nevertheless, using a careful analysis (given in the
proof of the next result) we can show that it is still possible to characterize rm i's best response in
the capacity game for a given capacity choice of rm j and the existing capacity of rm i using the
same kind of approach. The result is given in Theorem 1 and a symmetric result holds for the best
response of rm j.
Theorem 1. Let
SLi (xj)  yai (xj) 
Wi
2
,
sLi (xj)  SLi (xj) 
p
Ki,
sBi 
3
2
yci  Wi  
s
2Ki +

yci
2
 Wi
2
,
#i  A  Vi  Wi   2
p
yci (y
c
i  Wi), and
i (xj)  SLi (xj) 
q 
SLi (xj)
2   yci (yci  Wi) +Ki.
If Assumption 2 holds and there is holdback in production, then an optimal response for rm i, given
rm j's capacity decision xj, is
xi (xj) =
(
Si (xj) if zi  si (xj) ,
zi otherwise,
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where the expansion level function of rm i is
Si (xj) 
(
SLi (xj) for xj  #i,
yci for xj > #i.
and the expansion point function of rm i is
si (xj) 
8>><>>:
sLi (xj) for xj < #i,
i (xj) for #i  xj < yaj
 
sBi

,
sBi for xj  yaj
 
sBi

.
We refer to si as the expansion point function and Si as the expansion level function. When the existing
capacity zi is at the expansion point then the rm is indierent between investing in additional capacity
and not investing. The result of the above theorem is similar to the famous two-critical number (s; S)
policy from inventory theory (Scarf, 1960): Given the rival's available capacity, when the cumulative
capacity is below the expansion point, it is optimal to bring it up to the expansion level; otherwise,
it is optimal to leave it unchanged. Note that the expansion point and the expansion level depend
on the other rm's capacity choice in the rst stage. It is not hard to show that the function si is
continuous (for details see the online supplementary material) but the function Si is not continuous,
as shown in Figure 3.
The intuition behind Theorem 1 is as follows. When rm j's capacity choice of xj is lower than
#i and rm i's initial capacity of zi is less than the expansion point, i.e., (zi; xj) 2 
1 (
1, 
2, and

3 are dened in Figure 3), rm i will invest up to S
L
i (xj) based on its prot maximization and both
rms will produce up to their capacities in the production game. When (zi; xj) 2 
2, rm i should
invest up to yci . This has the eect of forcing rm j to produce at a level y
c
j which is less than its
capacity xj (in the proof we show that in this region y
c
j < #i < xj). When (zi; xj) 2 
3, rm i will not
invest since the production return from any investment activity is less than the investment expense.
As is clear from Figure 3, for certain values of existing capacity zi, the best response of rm i
moves from investing to not investing and then back to investing as the capacity choice of rm j
increases. The calculation of the best response function is complex because of the holdback possibility
in production. Even without the xed costs Ki we still obtain a curved boundary given by the function
i.
5 Equilibrium Analysis
After analyzing the production game and the best responses in the capacity game, we now consider
the rms' equilibrium behavior in the capacity game. It will be helpful to begin by dening some
preliminary quantities. We dene

xCi ; x
C
j

as the intersection point of functions SLi () and SLj (),
and thus the point we reach if both rms decide to invest. We have
xCi  yci  
2Wi  Wj
3
for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i.
Assumption 2 makes A  2Vi+ Vj   2Wi+Wj > 0 and A  2Vj + Vi  2Wj +Wi > 0, so the values of
xCi and x
C
j are positive. Note that Si () intersects Sj () only once at the point

xCi ; x
C
j

under the
following mild assumption:
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Figure 3: The Best Response of Firm i in Capacity Game with Holdback Production
Assumption 3. Wi  2Wj for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i.
Under this assumption, the uniqueness of the (INV, INV) strategy is assured. It is noted that this sort
of assumption and its variants have been explicitly or implicitly adopted in most analytical literatures
on capacity competition and industrial organization (see, e.g., Tirole, 1988).
We dene
bi  si
 
xCj

and bj  sj
 
xCi

.
Thus bi is the largest value of zi for which rm i invests, given that rm j also invests (so that we
reach a solution where both rms invest).
Finally, we dene ci as the solution of the equation
c = si
 
SLj (c)

: (1)
We can describe this as the smallest value of zi for which rm i does not invest, given that rm j
does invest, and rm j chooses its investment amount assuming rm i does not invest. Consideration
of the geometry of the situation shows that there can only be one solution of (1). The slope of SLj ()
is  2. We look for the intersection of this with the expansion point function s 1i (), shown as a bold
line in the left illustration of Figure 3. Since the slope of the s 1i () line below #i is  1=2, this line
can only intersect SLj () from above. Note that this also implies that
z < si
 
SLj (z)

if and only if z < ci. (2)
Because the values of bi and ci depend on the form of si (), it is not straightforward to write closed-form
formulae for either of them.
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The best response function derived in the last section puts us in a position to determine the
equilibrium of the capacity game. We limit our analysis to subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies (SPNE) that are described in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Then,
(i) the (INV, INV) strategy with (xi; xj) = (x
C
i ; x
C
j ) is a SPNE in the capacity game if and only if
the existing capacities satisfy condition (A): zi < bi and zj < bj;
(ii) the (INV, NI) strategy with (xi; xj) = (S
L
i (zj) ; zj) is a SPNE in the capacity game if and only if
the existing capacities satisfy condition (B): zi < si(zj) and cj  zj < #i;
(iii) the (INV, NI) strategy with (xi; xj) = (y
c
i ; zj) is a SPNE in the capacity game if and only if the
existing capacities satisfy condition (D): zi < si(zj) and zj  #i;
(iv) the (NI, NI) strategy with (xi; xj) = (zi; zj) is a SPNE in the capacity game if and only if the
existing capacities satisfy condition (F): zi  si(zj) and zj  sj(zi).
Proof.
Part (i). Let (xCi ; x
C
j ) be a SPNE for the capacity game. That is rm i chooses to invest up to x
C
i
and hence, by Theorem 1, zi < si

xCj

; at the same time, rm j chooses to invest up to xCj and so,
zj < sj
 
xCi

. This establishes the result in one direction. Conversely, under the conditions zi < si(x
C
j )
and zj < sj(x
C
i ), if rm j invests to the level x
C
j ; then the rm i will invest to the level S
L
i

xCj

= xCi
by Theorem 1. And, similarly if rm i invests to the level xCi : So (x
C
i ; x
C
j ) is a SPNE for the capacity
game.
Part (ii). Let (SLi (zj) ; zj) be a SPNE for the capacity game. Thus rm i chooses to invest up to
SLi (zj) and hence, from Theorem 1, zi < si (zj) and zj < #i; at the same time, rm j does not invest
and so, zj  sj
 
SLi (zj)

. Thus, from our previous observation (2) (Section 5), we have zj  cj . This
establishes the result in one direction. Conversely, under conditions zi < si(zj) and cj  zj < #i,
if rm j chooses not to expand its capacity level, then the rm i will invest to the level SLi (zj) by
Theorem 1. Since we have cj  zj < #i, we can conclude from (2) that zj  sj
 
SLi (zj)

. Hence, if rm
i invests to the level SLi (zj), then the rm j chooses not to expand its capacity level. So (S
L
i (zj) ; zj)
is a SPNE for the capacity game.
The other parts of the Theorem follow similarly. 
Parts (ii) and (iii) of the above theorem have symmetric versions with the roles of i and j reversed,
i.e., conditions (C): zj < sj(zi) and ci  zi < #j ; and (E): zj < sj(zi) and zi  #j .
Applying this theorem, we can nd the corresponding SPNE for the ten possible regions 1; :::;10
listed in Table 1 and shown in Figure 4. The example shown in Figure 4 is one which satises the
following two conditions: First,
bi > ci for i = 1; 2 (3)
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and second,
xsi < #j for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i (4)
where

xsi ; x
s
j

is the intersection point of function si () and sj (). Under these two conditions, there
are overlaps between the regions applying for parts (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2. In other words, these
conditions imply that regions 2, 3, 4, and 9 will exist. Without condition (3), there may be no
SPNE for some choices of parameters having
bj  zj < sj
 
SLi (zj)

.
In Section 5.1, we will give numerical examples for which no SPNE exists for certain existing capacities,
and for which either condition (3) or (4) does not hold. Notice that our results in Theorem 2 and Table
1 are general { without the restriction of conditions (3) and (4) { and only restricted by Assumptions
2 and 3.
Table 1: Equilibrium Behavior in Capacity Game
Region Conditions Satised SPNE of Investment Strategy Equilibrium Capacity
1 (A) (INV; INV ) (x
C
i ; x
C
j )
2 (A), (B), and (C)
(INV; INV ); (INV;NI)
and (NI; INV )
(xCi ; x
C
j ); (y
a
i (zj) Wi=2; zj)
and (zi; y
a
j (zi) Wj=2)
3 (A) and (B) (INV; INV ) and (INV;NI) (x
C
i ; x
C
j ) and (y
a
i (zj) Wi=2; zj)
4 (A) and (C) (INV; INV ) and (NI; INV ) (x
C
i ; x
C
j ) and (zi; y
a
j (zi) Wj=2)
5 (B) (INV;NI) (y
a
i (zj) Wi=2; zj)
6 (C) (NI; INV ) (zi; y
a
j (zi) Wj=2)
7 (D) (INV;NI) (y
c
i ; zj)
8 (E) (NI; INV ) (zi; y
c
j)
9 (B) and (C) (INV;NI) and (NI; INV )
(yai (zj) Wi=2; zj) and
(zi; y
a
j (zi) Wj=2)
10 (F ) (NI;NI) (zi; zj)
The rms' equilibrium behavior in the capacity game is illustrated in Figure 4. For the sake of expo-
sition, we will assume that both rms have identical costs in the following discussion. Roughly speak-
ing, if both have low existing capacities in comparison with expected future demand, i.e., (zi; zj) 2 1,
then there is an equilibrium (INV, INV ) in which they prefer to expand their capacity levels; if there
is high existing capacity in comparison with expected future demand, i.e., (zi; zj) 2 10, then there is
an equilibrium (NI, NI ) in which they prefer not to invest; and if, in comparison with expected future
demand, one rm has relatively low existing capacity but the other rm has relatively high existing
capacity, i.e., (zi; zj) 2 7 or 8 , then there is an equilibrium (INV, NI ) or (NI, INV ) in which one
rm prefers to invest but the other prefers not to invest.
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Figure 4: Mapping of Existing Capacity Pair onto Investment Equilibria
To help understand the way that the regions in Table 1 arise from the expansion point and the
expansion level functions, we consider the point marked O1 in Figure 4. What are the possible
equilibrium outcomes if (zi; zj) = O1? The possibility of neither rm investing is ruled out because
zj < sj(zi) (and also zi < si(zj) ), so that either rm not investing would cause the other to decide
to invest. Also the possibility of both rms investing is ruled out because zj > bj . If both rms were
to invest then they should make xi = x
C
i and xj = x
C
j . However, if rm j knows that rm i will
have capacity xCi , then the investment cost will not be worthwhile since zj > bj = sj
 
xCi

. So we can
deduce that in an equilibrium, only one rm will invest. If rm j invests but rm i does not, then we
will end at the point (xi; xj) = O2. But, this cannot be an equilibrium since at point O2 rm i would
choose to invest because xi is below its expansion point. On the other hand, if rm i invests but rm
j does not, then we will end at the point (xi; xj) = O3. This is a possible equilibrium outcome, (INV ,
NI), since we have zj = xj > sj(xi) at this point and so knowing the value of xi rm j would choose
not to invest.
Notice that in this case (and more generally if (zi; zj) 2 5 or 6) the weak rm, with lower existing
capacity, can expand its capacity level and force its competitor (with higher existing capacity) not to
invest, because the other rm cannot get enough revenue to cover its investment expenditure if both
of them were to invest. The strong rm, with higher existing capacity, nds it not worthwhile to make
an additional investment facing the aggressive challenger, and the challenger (rm i) nally obtains a
larger market share.
Our next result relates to the similarity between holdback and clearance in an equilibrium environ-
ment. We will return to this issue in Section 6. Suppose that rm i invests in additional capacity and
in the production stage of the game does not use all its capacity. Then a small reduction in investment
will not eect the production amounts and will result in reduced investment costs and an improved
prot. Hence we obtain the following result (which can also be checked directly by considering the
production quantities that occur in the dierent regions in Table 1).
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Lemma 4. Suppose that there is an equilibrium in which rm i invests in additional capacity, then
at the production stage rm i will set its production level equal to its capacity.
5.1 Multiple equilibria
When (zi; zj) 2 2;3;4; or 9; multiple equilibria occur in the capacity game. The obvious problem
with multiple equilibria is that the rms may not foresee which equilibrium will prevail. Mahajan
and van Ryzin (2001) argue that a symmetric equilibrium is more reasonable than an asymmetric
equilibrium according to the focal point eect proposed by Schelling (1960). Thus, in our case (INV ,
INV ) is a more likely equilibrium than (INV , NI) and (NI, INV ) for (zi; zj) 2 2. But, there
exists no symmetric equilibrium for (zi; zj) 2 3;4; or 9, in which each rm would prefer a dierent
equilibrium, for example rm i prefers (INV , NI) over (NI, INV ). Hence, it is possible that a
non-equilibrium outcome results since rm i plays one equilibrium strategy of (INV , NI) while rm j
chooses the other equilibrium strategy of (NI, INV ). However, if there exists some process of preplay
communication then Schelling argues that the players could become focused on one equilibrium. For
instance, if rm i can convince rm j of its persistence in the INV strategy we might well expect
them to play (INV , NI). See Cachon and Netessine (2004) for a discussion of the implications of
multiple equilibria in game theory models of operations and supply chain.
On the other hand if there are no xed costs, the multiple equilibrium regions, 2;3;4; and 9,
disappear since the expansion point and the expansion level functions are identical (i.e., si () = Si ()
when Ki = 0). Thus setting Ki = Kj = 0, Theorem 2 implies:
Corollary 1. In a production holdback environment with no xed costs of investment, there always
exists a unique SPNE for any existing capacities (zi; zj).
In other words, the existence of xed costs adds more strategic uncertainty in the capacity game,
as suggested by Porter (1980). If there are no clues prior to starting the game (i.e., preplay commu-
nication), both rms may simultaneously play the INV strategy aiming for an equilibrium in which
the other player does not invest. This can happen for (zi; zj) 2 2;3;4 or 9 when scale economies
in investment are signicant, and will imply some industry excess capacity. The examples we give in
section 5.3 conrm that this is not just a theoretical possibility.
Remark 1. When there are xed costs of investment, for certain existing capacities in the capacity
game there may be either multiple equilibria, or no equilibrium.
5.2 Production versus investment costs
This formulation also allows us to investigate the consequences of sunk investment costs (represented
by Wi). We expect that when costs are moved away from the production decision (represented by
Vi) and instead are incurred at the time of investment (represented by Wi) then this will enable
the investing rm to demonstrate greater commitment - hence allowing more eective preemptive
investment strategies in the holdback environment. For example, this could happen if rm i was to
commit to purchase raw materials at the same time as building capacity; or if rm i was to choose a
higher level of automation. If this eect occurs, we can expect that the region where rm j is able to
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gain from investing, even though rm i has already built a large capacity, will be reduced. In other
words, we expect that the region including 6 and 8 will be reduced. Formally,
Corollary 2. Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold and suppose that Vi and Wi are changed as
follows: V newi = Vi   and Wnewi =Wi +. Then, the region 6 [ 8 decreases as  increases.
Proof. To complete this proof, we consider moving a cost  from Vi to Wi, so V
new
i = Vi   and
Wnewi =Wi+. It is easy to see that this increases the Cournot equilibrium amount y
c
i by an amount
2=3 and decreases ycj by an amount =3. Hence #j increases. Note that y
a
i (xj) is increased by =2
and so both sLi () and SLi () are unchanged. Moreover SLj () is unchanged, so ci will also be unchanged.
Finally observe that sBj decreases since y
c
j decreases and
@sBj
@ycj
=
3
2
  y
c
j=2 Wjr
2Kj +

ycj=2 Wj
2 > 0:
It is straightforward to see from Figure 4 that the net eect is to reduce 6 [ 8, since we have
extended 6 to the right and reduced the horizontal upper boundary of 8 (which is at s
B
j ). 
We can also investigate the eect of moving a cost from Vi to Wi on rm i's prot. Using simple
algebra (see the on-line supplementary material), we obtain:
Remark 2. In a production holdback environment, the ability of a rm to preempt an entering rm
can be strengthened by moving a cost from the variable cost of production to the variable cost of
investment. Prots for the incumbent will be increased except in cases where there is a large excess
initial capacity.
As Porter notes (1980: 101): `Perhaps the single most important concept in planning and executing
oensive and defensive competitive moves is the concept of commitment. ... The persuasiveness of a
commitment is related to the degree to which it appears binding and irreversible.' Previous models
have usually treated capacity commitment as employing a production clearance strategy. These results
show that in this environment a type of commitment can occur that arises from the structure of
the costs of investment and production, even though there cannot be any binding or irreversible
determination of the future production level. Furthermore this type of commitment, achieved by
advancing production costs, will have a positive impact on rm performance if there is not too large
an excess capacity. This is a new observation in model-based capacity strategy research (Ghemawat
and Cassiman, 2007). This analytical nding ts the empirical observations in competitive strategy
(Chen et al., 2002) and suggests that, in a production holdback environment, a rm may benet from
investing in production lines involving higher investment cost but lower operating costs (for example
through opting to use a higher degree of automation).
5.3 Examples of Asymmetric Firms
Our model allows us to consider cases with asymmetric costs between rms. We illustrate how our
theoretical results apply to asymmetric cases by exploring the following three examples to gain addi-
tional insights. It is noted that all of the examples satisfy Assumption 2.
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Example 1. There are two rms in a concentrated market, rm 1 with a high cost technology and
rm 2 with a low cost technology. The rms have cost functions: V1 = 1, W1 = 1:4 and K1 = 6 for
rm 1, and V2 = 0:5, W2 = 1 and K2 = 3 for rm 2. Demand is characterized by A = 10.
Figure 5: Example 1 for Asymmetric Duopoly
Applying Theorem 2, we can show the equilibrium behavior of investment for the rst example
in Figure 5. Except for (z1; z2) 2 5 [ 9, rm 1 will never invest in additional capacity. According
to the denition of region 9, rm 2 also has a chance to invest for (z1; z2) 2 9. So in this region
there are two possible equilibria. This equilibrium outcome for (z1; z2) 2 9 is similar to the famous
battle-of-the-sexes outcome. Only if there exists a focal point eect such as preplay communication
may we have an expectation on which asymmetric equilibrium will occur. The example implies that
a rm with signicant cost advantage over the other will choose to invest even if the rm has no
existing capacity and its competitor owns high existing capacity, i.e., (z1; z2) 2 6 [8. Thus, in this
instance building excess capacity is not a good strategy for an incumbent with a cost disadvantage.
This is because the production holdback environment does not allow the incumbent to commit to full
production, and so building excess capacity does not provide a credible commitment. This outcome
is similar to the well-known example of the steel industry, where leading integrated steel mills proved
to have no incumbent advantage upon encountering the challenge from entering minimills with a
disruptive technology of production (e.g., Christensen, 1997).
Example 2. The parameters in this example are the same as for example 1, except we take K1 = 0,
that is, the incumbent (rm 1) has an incumbent advantage in that its xed cost has already been
spent (or sunk). We leave other parameters unchanged. Therefore, rm 1 has an expansion point
function that is the same as its expansion level function. The equilibrium behavior of investment in
this example is shown in Figure 6. If the incumbent's existing capacity is small in comparison with
expected demand, i.e., (z1; z2) 2 1, the incumbent and the entrant (rm 2) will invest simultaneously.
In this example, condition (4) does not hold since xc1 > #2 so there is no equilibrium for the existing
capacity pairs in the region we have labeled 0. For (z1; z2) 2 0, z1 is below rm 1's expansion point
but z2 is above rm 2's expansion point. Following Theorem 1, rm 1 would like to invest such that
(x1; z2) 2 8 and rm 2 chooses not to invest. After rm 1's investment decision, rm 2 will invest its
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Figure 6: Example 2 for Asymmetric Duopoly
capacity level up to yc2. Therefore, there is no equilibrium for any (z1; z2) 2 0.
Figure 7: Example 3 for bi < ci 8i
Example 3. Finally, consider an example shown in Figure 7 for which the rms have cost functions:
V1 = 1, W1 = 0:5 and K1 = 1 for rm 1 and V2 = 2, W2 = 0:01 and K2 = 3 for rm 2, and the
demand intercept A is 10. In this instance, condition (3) does not hold and there is no equilibrium
for the existing capacities in the shaded region we label 0. To help in understanding why there is no
equilibrium in region 0, we look at point O4. At point O4, z1 and z2 are both below their expansion
points so that (NI, NI) is not an equilibrium outcome. If rm 1 invests but rm 2 does not, we move
to point O5. But, at point O5 rm 2 would choose to invest because z2 is below its expansion point.
Hence, point O5 is not an equilibrium outcome. On the other hand, if rm 2 invests but rm 1 does
not, then we move to point O6. At point O6, rm 1 would choose to invest because z1 is below its
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expansion point. Thus, neither (INV , NI) nor (NI, INV ) is an equilibrium outcome for point O4.
In addition, (INV , INV ) is not an equilibrium outcome since z1 > b1 and so rm 1 would decide not
to invest if x2 = x
C
2 .
5.4 When can strategic deterrence occur?
The examples given above have demonstrated that building excess capacity may not to be an eective
strategy for an incumbent to deter the potential entrant from investing in capacity under the produc-
tion holdback environment. The ineectiveness of excess capacity by rm i is related to the fact that
for low values of zj no matter how large zi becomes, the investment equilibria falls into 8 where rm
j invests. The condition for this to happen is that sBj > 0, i.e.,
3
2
ycj  Wj >
s
2Kj +

ycj
2
 Wj
2
.
This inequality reduces to Kj < y
c
j

ycj  Wj

. Thus we have shown that only when the xed cost
of investment for the other rm is larger than a certain threshold, ycj

ycj  Wj

, will it be possible for
an incumbent to invest aggressively in order to eliminate a potential rival from entering a market.
This discussion demonstrates that excess capacity will often not be an eective strategy when
symmetric-cost rms employ holdback in production. We therefore would not expect to see an excess-
capacity strategy in a competitive environment in which rms are able to use holdback in their
production. This result seems to be supported by empirical observations made by Lieberman (1987c),
who looked at the chemical industry over a roughly 25 year period and found that excess capacity was
very rarely used as an entry deterrent.
5.5 Equilibrium with Cost Parity
In this section we will simplify our analysis to isolate the strategic issues governing capacity investment
decisions. We wish to eliminate the eects of asymmetric costs and so we will assume that all capacity
and production costs for rms are identical, i.e., cost parity, as does Anand and Girotra (2007). This
will allow us to omit the subscripts of parameters and functions in Theorems 1 and 2 in the following.
The cost parity makes xC < #. Without loss of generality, we can adjust the price A and normalize
the production costs to zero (Vi = Vj = V = 0). In addition, the following assumption is imposed
to avoiding the trivial case where the expansion point functions are negative (i.e., both rms never
invest).
Assumption 4. K < A(A  3W )=9.
This assumption together with Assumption 2 make xC > xs > 0 and condition (4) holds. However,
condition (3) may or may not hold here, depending on the magnitude of the xed cost; thus the multiple
equilibrium regions 2;3 and 4 may exist or not. The capacity equilibrium behavior under cost
parity is shown in Figure 8. We can see that when zj = 0, rm j will enter the market if either
(zi; 0) 2 1;4;6 or 8 in Figure 8(a) or (zi; 0) 2 1;6 or 8 in Figure 8(b). Note that there does
not exist any equilibrium in the capacity game if (zi; 0) 2 0, shown in Figure 8(b).
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Figure 8: Capacity Equilibrium under Holdback Production and Cost Parity
Finally, the simplest case occurs when we set the xed cost K to zero and leave other parameters
unchanged. In this setting, Assumption 2 makes 0 < xC < # so that b = c = xC . We nd that the
equilibrium regions l, l = 1; 5; 6; 7; 8; 10, cover the entire (zi; zj) space, shown in Figure 9.
6 Two alternative models
So far our analysis has relied on two presumptions that we will relax in this section: rst that the
holdback strategy is available in production, and second that in the rst stage capacity decisions
are made simultaneously due to the long lead time. Section 6.1 studies the competitive environment
when holdback is not possible; and Section 6.2 analyzes alternating capacity decisions { where one
rm invests rst and the other invests later. This alternating scheme is simpler than the model of
simultaneous capacity decisions. By investigating it we want to nd out whether the holdback (or
clearance) strategy has the same impact on the equilibrium behavior in the sequential-decision scheme
as it does in the simultaneous-decision scheme?
6.1 Clearance in Production
In order to understand the dierence between employing holdback and clearance, we now analyze
investment equilibrium behavior in a simultaneous-move game assuming that rms use clearance as
a production strategy (so that rms make decisions on capacity and production at the same time).
This is an assumption that has been made by most model-based literature on competitive capacity
investment.
From Lemma 4 we know that in the event that both rms choose to invest, then the clearance
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Figure 9: Capacity Equilibrium under Holdback Production, Cost Parity and Zero Fixed Costs
and holdback strategies will be the same. However, we will see that there are substantial dierences
in behavior when one rm has excess capacity.
The solutions in the clearance case will involve the simpler functions sLi , s
L
j , S
L
i and S
L
j rather
than si, sj , Si and Sj . This allows us to be more explicit. We dene
bLi = s
L
i
 
xCj

= yai (x
C
j ) 
Wi
2
 
p
Ki
= xCi  
p
Ki:
Also we have cLi = s
L
i

SLj
 
cLi

from which we deduce
cLi = x
C
i  
4
3
p
Ki
(with matching expressions for bLj and c
L
j ). We can establish the following result for the rms' capacity
equilibrium in pure strategies:
Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds and both rms use a production clearance strategy.
Then,
(i) the investment pair (INV; INV ) with (xi; xj) =

xCi ; x
C
j

is a SPNE in the capacity game if and
only if the existing capacities satisfy the conditions zi < b
L
i and zj < b
L
j ;
(ii) the investment pair (INV;NI) with (xi; xj) =
 
SLi (zj) ; zj

is a SPNE in the capacity game if and
only if the existing capacities satisfy the conditions zi < s
L
i (zj) and zj  cLj (and a matching
result for the investment pair (NI; INV ) with i and j reversed);
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(iii) the investment pair (NI;NI) with (xi; xj) = (zi; zj) is a SPNE in the capacity game if and only
if the existing capacities satisfy the conditions zi  sLi (zj) and zj  sLj (zi).
Proof. Under a production clearance environment, xi = yi and xj = yj . Then, we can write
Li (x; xj) = (A  Vi   x  xj)x
for the operational prot of rm i in production. Given the rival's investment decision xj , the optimal
prot of rm i in the capacity game can be written:
Li (zi; xj) =
(
Li
 
SLi (xj) ; xj
 Wi  SLi (xj)  zi Ki for zi < sLi (xj) ,
Li (zi; xj) otherwise.
Here (A  Vi  Wi   xj) =2 is the unique maximizer of function

Li (x; xj) Wi (x  zi)
	
for each xj
and is equal to SLi (xj). In this case, S
L
i (xj) exists because 
L
i is strictly concave in its rst argument.
The smallest value of  for which
i (; xj) Wi (   zi) = i
 
SLi (xj) ; xj
 Wi  SLi (xj)  zi Ki
is (A  Vi  Wi   xj) =2  
p
Ki which is equal to s
L
i (xj). Thus we have established that rm i's
optimal policy of investment for given xj is as follows:
xi (xj) =
(
SLi (xj) for zi < s
L
i (xj) ,
zi otherwise.
This is to be compared with Theorem 1 and can be used to prove the result in the same way that
Theorem 2 was established.
Consider case (ii) when zi < s
L
i (zj) and zj  cLj . Under these conditions the optimal response
for rm i to rm j not investing is to invest up to a capacity level of SLi (zj). On the other hand if
zj  cLj then zj  sj
 
SLi (zj)

and hence the optimal response for rm j to this investment by rm i
is not to invest. In the other direction if (xi; xj) =
 
SLi (zj) ; zj

is a SPNE in the capacity game then
we derive the conditions zi < s
L
i (zj) and zj  sj
 
SLi (zj)

immediately.
The other two cases follow similarly. 
Since bLi  cLi , with equality when the xed cost Ki = 0 we can deduce the following corollary:
Corollary 3. In the production clearance environment, there exists at least one SPNE for each pair
of existing capacities, and if there are no xed costs of investment, then this SPNE is unique.
Figure 10 shows the equilibrium behavior in a case where there is cost parity (Vi = Vj , Wi =Wj , and
Ki = Kj). This gure demonstrates that when zj = 0, rm i can deter rm j's entry provided that
rm i has sucient existing capacity such that (zi; 0) 2 L10. Specically we can see that, whether
or not there is cost parity, xj = zj = 0 is the equilibrium outcome for zi >
 
sLi
 1
(0). We can
summarize:
Remark 3. For an incumbent facing a potential entrant in a production clearance environment,
strategic preemption with a large amount of existing capacity can deter the entrant.
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Figure 10: Capacity Equilibrium under Clearance Production and Cost Parity
In general the production clearance environment is more favorable for the incumbent and less
favorable for the potential entrant in comparison with the holdback environment. In the online sup-
plementary material we analyze in more detail the case that the xed costs are zero and where rm
i is an entrant with zi = 0 and rm j is an incumbent with zj > #i, and we show that in this case
protability for the incumbent is greater with a clearance environment. Other cases are similar.
By comparing the overall prots arising from holdback and clearance, we obtain:
Remark 4. A production clearance environment gives more prot for the incumbent and less prot
for the potential entrant.
6.2 Alternating Investment Decisions
In this section, we consider an alternative capacity-decision scheme that of two rms making investment
decisions sequentially, as is often assumed in the commitment literature (see Tirole, 1988). We thus
assume that the lead time (or at least time to commit to a certain capacity) is short enough to enable
the leading rm to have completed this stage prior to its rival's investment decision. This makes
the analysis much easier compared to the simultaneous decision scheme. Assume that rm i is a
leader, rm j is a follower, and both have no capacity ex ante (zi = zj = 0). As in Section 5.2, we
assume identical costs between the rms in order to isolate the industry issues related to the impacts
of holdback and clearance production. Moreover, we take Vi = Vj = 0 without loss of generality.
In addition to analytical simplicity, another useful property of this decision scheme is that we can
ignore the eect of xed costs without loss of generality. Specically, the leader can easily evaluate
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whether the entrant enters the market or not by deducting the xed cost from its revenue. If the
entrant's net prot allowing for the xed cost is positive, it enters; otherwise, it does not. Note that
this property does not hold in the simultaneous decision scheme (see Remark 2). As a result, there
are no issues of multiple equilibria and non-equilibrium in the sequential setting. Roughly speaking,
there is less strategic uncertainty for a short lead time.
Through a careful analysis given in the on-line supplementary material, the following results are
obtained.
Remark 5. The rst-mover advantage always exists in the sequential setting no matter what produc-
tion policy is employed.
Remark 6. No matter what the decision sequence (simultaneous or sequential move), holdback produc-
tion always reduces the advantage of having more existing capacity, and clearance production reinforces
the advantage.
7 Conclusion
This paper develops a game-theoretical model to analyze competitive responses for strategic capacity
investment. In particular, we consider the joint eect of several operational characteristics including
existing capacity, scale economies, lead time, and production policy on capacity investment in equi-
librium. Each rm makes two decisions: choice of capacity and choice of production quantity. The
capacity decision sequence (simultaneous or alternating) and production policy (holdback or clearance)
are both determined by the competitive environment in which the rms operate. We develop the best
response of the rms in the capacity decision and use it to develop the rms' equilibrium behavior for
both simultaneous and sequential investment decisions. After introducing plausible assumptions, we
are able to solve the entire game in closed form. One novel element in our model is that competing
rms are able to have some existing capacity prior to the start of the competitive capacity investment
decisions. Furthermore, our work diers from the capacity-related literature by explicitly considering
the ex-ante asymmetries that exist in both existing capacities and investment costs. Our ndings
provide systematic answers to questions about how to restrain competitive responses to a capacity
action:
1. The existing literature has shown that making simultaneous moves reduces the commitment
implied by ex ante capacity in comparison with a sequential move, see Dixit (1980) and Tirole
(1988). We conrm that this result holds under our setting as well, and further show that this
eect of move sequence is much stronger for rms in a production clearance environment than
in a holdback environment. In other words, the commitment value of ex ante capacity can be
reduced when there are both a long lead time to build additional capacity and a production
holdback environment. So, operational factors do matter to capacity strategy.
2. We show that in the production holdback environment, excess capacity cannot deter the entry
of the potential competitor no matter how large the existing capacity of the incumbent rm.
This is dierent to the clearance environment where an incumbent with sucient capacity can
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deter entry. More generally, in the leader-follower game of capacity investment the rst-mover
advantage is greater in a clearance environment.
3. Under holdback production, our analytical result shows that the commitment represented by
existing capacity can be strengthened by moving a cost from the variable cost of production
to the variable cost of investment. This is an example of commitment being increased as
the investment action involves more irreversibility (Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Hayes et al.,
2005; Chronopoulos et al., 2011). In other words, an incumbent rm has a greater preemptive
advantage if its production facilities involve higher investment cost but lower operational cost.
Usually this leads to an improvement in the incumbent's prot (though this improved prot can
be canceled out by the additional costs in building an initial excess capacity).
4. We nd that in a production holdback environment xed costs make the problem of simultaneous
investment complicated in two dierent ways: rst they introduce the possibility of multiple
equilibria in investment competition, and second xed costs mean that Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies may not exist for some existing capacities. However, these complications only
arise when the lead time is suciently long. In other words, xed costs and long lead times
increase strategic uncertainty (emerging endogenously from the strategic interactions between
competing rms) as argued by Porter (1980). So strategic uncertainty is much greater than is
suggested by previous studies that do not consider xed costs and lead time.
These ndings provide practical guidelines for competitive moves in capacity races. For rms in
a production clearance environment, an incumbent may consider acting aggressively in investment
in order to deter potential entrants, but should act more cautiously in order to maintain its market
share facing another incumbent. These `asymmetric' responses have been observed in concentrated
industries (Lieberman, 1987a). On the other hand, rms in a production holdback environment, no
matter whether they are incumbents or new entrants, should recognize that investment is likely to
take place by all parties and hence they need to structure their decisions to avoid industry excess
capacity. This type of `symmetric' response has been observed in the brick industry (Wood, 2005).
For a potential entrant, entering an industry with production holdback possibilities and long lead
times gives a greater chance of success, rather than entering an industry with clearance and short lead
times. Overall, an entrant should act with aggressive capacity investment under holdback production,
but act passively under clearance production.
A central message of this paper is the importance of the link between a rm's operations (produc-
tion policy) and its competitive environment (industry structure, production technology, and its costs
of investment and production). This paper makes contributions to theory of operations strategy, in
particular for capacity strategy. First we characterize the equilibrium solution of the strategic capacity
game in a way that is similar to the well-known (s; S) policy from inventory and supply chain theory
(Scarf, 1960). But in addition, we see this paper as advancing the theoretical foundation of capacity
strategy by analyzing competitive outcome under dierent operational characteristics.
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Supplementary Material for \Competition through capacity investment
under asymmetric existing capacities and costs"
Before giving the proof of Theorem 1 it is helpful to establish a result that gives the general form of
the solution involving an expansion point and expansion level.
Lemma 5. Suppose that i is concave in its rst argument and let
gi (xi; xj)  i (xi; xj) Wixi :
Then there are real valued functions, si (xj) and Si (xj), where, for each xj, Si (xj) is the choice of
xi 2 (zi;1) which maximizes gi (xi; xj) over this range, and si (xj) is the smallest value of  for which
gi (; xj) = gi
 
Si (xj) ; xj
  Ki. Given the existing capacity pair (zi; zj) and conjecturing the rival's
capacity choice of xj, an optimal capacity level for rm i is
xi =
(
Si (xj) if zi  si (xj) ,
zi otherwise.
Proof. We can rewrite i as
i (zi; xj) =Wizi +max

gi (zi; xj) ;max
xi>zi
[gi (xi; xj) Ki]

:
If the function i is strictly concave in its rst argument, then so is the function gi. We can easily
check that i (xi; xj) is bounded and so there is a unique maximizer of gi (xi; xj) over the range (zi;1).
Thus the equation for i is equivalent to
i (zi; xj) =
(
Wizi + gi
 
Si (xj) ; xj
 Ki for zi  si (xj) ,
Wizi + gi (zi; xj) otherwise,
with the functions si () and Si () dened in the lemma statement. If zi  si (xj), then gi (zi; xj) 
gi
 
Si (xj) ; xj
 Ki and, therefore, it is optimal to invest in bringing the capacity level up to Si (xj).
If si (xj) < zi  Si (xj), then, by the strict concavity of gi, gi (zi; xj) > gi
 
Si (xj) ; xj
  Ki, so it is
optimal not to invest. If zi > Si (xj), it is also optimal not to invest due to the strict concavity of gi.
Note that si (xj) < Si (xj) since Ki > 0, and the derivative of gi at si is positive. 
Now we prove Theorem 1 by considering a number of cases which deal with dierent regions for
zi and xj . It will be helpful to split the 0 region in (xi; xj) space into three:
1 
n
(xi; xj)
 0  xi < yci and 0  xj < ycj o ,
2 
n
(xi; xj)
 0  xi < yci and ycj  xj < yaj (xi)o ,
3 
n
(xi; xj)
 yci  xi < yai (xj) and 0  xj < ycj o ,
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Proof of Theorem 1:
Case 1. (zi; xj) 2 5 [ 6
In this case we have zi  min(yci ; yai (xj)) so after investment the same inequality holds and
(xi; xj) 2 5 [ 6. From Lemma 3(iii) and 3(iv) the equilibrium in the production game is inde-
pendent of the value of xi. Therefore, an investment by rm i would involve cost without benet and
hence the best response of rm i is not to invest.
Case 2. (zi; xj) 2 1 [ 3
In this case we have zi < y
a
i (xj) and xj  ycj . By Lemma 3 the upper bound of required
capacity in the production game is yai (xj) and so investment does not take place beyond that level,
i.e. zi  xi  yai (xj). In this case the best production quantity for each rm equals its capacity, using
Lemma 3. Thus the operating prot function is
i (xi; xj) = (A  xi   xj   Vi)xi, (A1)
which is strictly concave in xi over the region of interest for each xj . Hence we can apply Lemma 4
where the function gi is
gi (xi; xj) = (A  xi   xj   Vi)xi  Wixi,
which is concave for every xj . The maximum is achieved when xi is at the expansion level function of
rm i, and so taking derivatives we obtain
SLi (xj) =
A  Vi   xj  Wi
2
= yai (xj) 
Wi
2
.
The expansion point function of rm i is
sLi (xj) = min


 gi (; xj) = gi  SLi (xj) ; xj Ki	 :
So sLi (xj) is the smaller root of the quadratic
(A    xj   Vi) Wi =

A  Vi   xj  Wi
2
2
 Ki;
and hence
sLi (xj) =
A  Vi   xj  Wi
2
 
p
Ki:
Hence from Lemma 4, if 0  zi  sLi (xj) then xi = SLi (xj) and otherwise, xi = zi.
Case 3. (zi; xj) 2 4
In this case, zi < y
c
i and xj  yaj (zi). Thus xj > ycj and from Lemmas 3(ii) and 3(iv), we
know that if xi  yci after rm i's investment decision, then the equilibrium output (yci ; ycj) occurs in
the production game; otherwise, the equilibrium output (xi; y
a
j (xi)) occurs in the production game.
Therefore, rm i's capacity choice is in the range [zi; y
c
i ] since rm i never produces more than y
c
i in
the production game.
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The operating prot function for rm i is
i
 
xi; y
a
j (xi)

=
 
A  xi   yaj (xi)  Vi

xi (A2)
which is strictly concave in xi. Hence the approach of Lemma 5 can be used, with gi allowing for the
response of rm j. Thus
gi
 
xi; y
a
j (xi)

= i
 
xi; y
a
j (xi)
 Wixi
=
 
A  xi   yaj (xi)  Vi

xi  Wixi:
Maximizing over xi gives
@gi

xi; y
a
j (xi)

@xi
=
A
2
  xi   Vi + Vj
2
 Wi = 0
and hence the maximum is at xi = 3y
c
i =2   Wi. But from Assumption 2, yci =2 > Wi and so this
maximum occurs at a value greater than yci . Hence we can deduce that the expansion level of rm i
is yci . In other words if investment takes place it is best to invest up to a level y
c
i , when both rms
will produce at the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium

yci ; y
c
j

.
The expansion point function is the lowest root of the equation
gi
 
; yaj ()

= i
 
yci ; y
c
j
 Wiyci  Ki
= (A Wi   Vi   yci   ycj)yci  Ki:
This is a quadratic
A    A  Vj   
2

  (Vi +Wi) = (A  2Vi + Vj   3Wi) (A  2Vi + Vj)
9
 Ki
which has roots (after some algebra):
(A+ Vj   2Vi)
2
 Wi 
s
2Ki +

A  2Vi + Vj
6
 Wi
2
:
The smaller root is sBi . From Lemma 4, we know that: if 0  zi  sBi then xi = yci ; otherwise, xi = zi.
Case 4. (zi; xj) 2 2
In this case, zi < y
c
i and y
c
j < xj < y
a
j (zi). The analysis of optimal behavior in this region is
complex. If rm i has decided to invest in additional capacity, there are two possible equilibrium
outcomes in the production game: either (1) the production equilibrium is (xi; xj) if (xi; xj) 2 2; or
(2) the production equilibrium is

xi; y
a
j (xi)

if (xi; xj) 2 4. In fact, the function i is not unimodal
as a result of the equilibrium output in the production game being dierent between regions 2 and
4.
We begin by considering rm i's best response function under Assumption 2 for (xi; xj) 2 2.
Given xj , the upper boundary of 2 is reached when xi takes the value
xi =
 
yaj
 1
(xj) = A  Vj   2xj .
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While (xi; xj) 2 2, i.e. xi is in the range (zi; A   Vj   2xj), the operating prot function i (xi; xj)
follows the quadratic function (A1) given above. However, if (xi; xj) 2 4 after rm i invests, then yj
is reduced to yaj (xi) in the production phase of the game (see Lemma 3(ii)). This leads the operating
prot function of rm i to be a dierent quadratic function, (A2).
First observe that if rm i invests enough, so that (xi; xj) 2 4, then under Assumption 2, the
net prot i

xi; y
a
j (xi)

 Wi (xi   zi)  Ki is still increasing at xi = yci (as in Case 3 above). It is
easy to see that investment to a level beyond yci is not worthwhile and so the prot is maximized at
xi = y
c
i . Hence the maximum value of rm i's prot if it invests to a level xi where (xi; xj) 2 4 is
i
 
yci ; y
c
j
 Wi (yci   zi) Ki =Wizi + gi  yci ; ycj Ki. (A3)
We also need to consider the case where rm i's investment decision leaves (xi; xj) 2 2. In this
case, we know from Lemma 3(i) that yi = xi for each i and so the best choice of xi is given by S
L
i (xj)
and the maximum value of prot for rm i if its investment decision makes (xi; xj) 2 2 is
Wizi + gi
 
SLi (xj) ; xj
 Ki (A4)
which needs to be compared to (A3) above. Later we will establish that in the cases where (A4) is
better than (A3) then xi = S
L
i (xj) will satisfy the constraint that (xi; xj) 2 2.
Let
	i (xj)  gi

yci ; y
c
j

  gi
 
SLi (xj) ; xj

=

2ycj   2xj  Wi

Wi   2

ycj   xj

(yci + y
a
i (xj))
4
be the dierence between (A3) and (A4). Note that 	i is a concave quadratic because the coecient
of x2j is negative. Thus 	i (xj) is negative below the lower root of the quadratic
 
2ycj   2xj  Wi

Wi  
 
ycj   xj

(2yci +A  Vi   xj) = 0;
i.e. for xj values less than
#i  A  Vi  Wi   2
q
yci (y
c
i  Wi).
(From Assumption 2 this is well-dened). For these xj values (A4) is larger than (A3) and the
expansion level for rm i is SLi (xj). Note that #i > y
c
j since
#i   ycj = A  Vi  Wi  
A  2Vj + Vi
3
  2
q
yci (y
c
i  Wi)
= 2yci  Wi   2
q
yci (y
c
i  Wi)
=
p
yci  
q
(yci  Wi)
2
> 0:
We want to show that, when xj is less than #i, the expansion level suggested, which is S
L
i (xj),
is still in 2. To do this, we introduce i for the intersection of S
L
i (xj) and the upper boundary
xj = y
a
j (xi) of region 2, which occurs at an xj value of
i  yaj (xi) = ycj +
Wi
3
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by solving yaj (S
L
i ()) =  (note that, under Assumption 2, i < y
a
j (0) which is the highest value in
2). Now
i   #i = 2

2Wi
3
  yci +
q
yci (y
c
i  Wi)

:
But using Assumption 2, yci > 2Wi and so
yci (y
c
i  Wi) 

yci  
2Wi
3
2
=
Wi
3
(yci  
4Wi
3
) > 0:
Thus q
yci (y
c
i  Wi) > yci  
2Wi
3
;
and i > #i as we require is obtained.
This completes the analysis of the expansion level function for this case and we now consider the
expansion point function giving the condition for investment for (zi; xj) 2 2. For ycj  xj < #i the
analysis is essentially the same as in Case 2 and we can show that the expansion point function of
rm i is sLi (xj) .
For #i  xj < yaj (0), we start by dening a function
Gi (; xj)  i

yci ; y
c
j

 Wi (yci   ) Ki   i (; xj)
=  [  2yai (xj) +Wi] + yci (yci  Wi) Ki,
which is the net gain from investing up to level yci , given capacity  (2 [0; (yaj ) 1 (xj)]) and the other
player's capacity xj (> y
c
j). The function Gi is convex and quadratic in its rst argument. Investment
is worthwhile if Gi is positive and the expansion point function is simply the lower root of the equation
Gi (; xj) = 0, which is:
i (xj) = y
a
i (xj) 
Wi
2
 
q
"i (xj)
where
"i (xj) 

yai (xj) 
Wi
2
2
  yci (yci  Wi) +Ki.
We can also check that there is no problem caused by the fact that, in this case, if the rm does not
invest the payo is not monotonic in capacity - which could suggest that there will be more complex
behavior involving going back to investing for higher values of xi. To show that this does not happen,
we want to show that if
i (xj) <
 
yaj
 1
(xj) ; (A5)
then Gi (; xj) is still negative at the boundary  =

yaj
 1
(xj) = A  Vj   2xj . The condition (A5)
is
A  Vi  Wi   xj
2
 
q
"i (xj) < A  Vj   2xj :
Rearranging and squaring this becomes
A  Vi  Wi   xj
2
2
  yci (yci  Wi) +Ki >

2Vj  A  Vi  Wi + 3xj
2
2
:
Hence
Ki   yci (yci  Wi)  (Vj  A+ 2xj) (Vj   Vi  Wi + xj) > 0:
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But the left hand side of this inequality is simply Gi (A  Vj   2xj ; xj) establishing the inequality we
require. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
We want to show that the expansion function is continuous. To do this we will modify the argument
above to show that the function i (xj) crosses the boundary of 2 at s
B
i . Since i (xj) =

yaj
 1
(xj)
implies
Ki   yci (yci  Wi)  (Vj  A+ 2xj) (Vj   Vi  Wi + xj) = 0:
This is a quadratic in xj and (after some algebra) we nd that the roots are
A  3Vj + 2Vi
4
+
Wi
2
 1
2
s
2Ki +

Wi   y
c
i
2
2
and the upper root is exactly yaj
 
sBi

(note that the lower root turns out to be less than ycj , and
so is not relevant). We can also show that i (#i) = s
L
i (#i) =
p
yci (y
c
i  Wi)  
p
Ki. Thus we
have demonstrated the continuity of the expansion point function. We could also establish this result
indirectly by observing that the cost of investing is a continuous function of the amount invested (away
from 0) and the prot after investment is a continuous function of the nal position. Therefore the
maximum prot if it is decided to invest (optimizing over the amount) is continuous. The intersection
of the two surfaces (prot from investing and prot from not investing) denes the expansion point
function which must therefore be continuous.
Proof of Remark 2. We can also investigate the eect of moving a cost  from Vi to Wi on rm
i's prot. Assume that zj = 0, i.e. rm j is a new entrant. We will also suppose that a change
which adds cost to the investment component Wi includes an additional cost in respect of the existing
capacity zi. Suppose that zi < bi and 0 < bj (e.g. (zi; 0) in region 1) so that both rms invest and
(xi; xj) = (x
C
i ; x
C
j ). The prot to rm i in this case is
i =
 
A  xCi   xCj

xCi   VixCi  WixCi  Ki
(note that we have included the prior expenditure of Wizi in this expression). Since x
C
i , x
C
j and
Vi +Wi are all unchanged by the move of cost, there is no change in prot overall: there is a change
in the timing of expenditure, rather than the amount of expenditure.
Next consider the case where 0 < sj(zi) and ci  zi < #j (e.g. (zi; 0) in region 6) so that rm i
does not invest and xj = S
L
j (zi) which is unchanged by the move of costs. Moreover, in this region
the production quantity for rm i is equal to the capacity zi (see proof of Theorem 1, Case 4). Again
there is no change in rm i's overall prot.
Now consider the case that 0 < sj(zi) and zi  #j (i.e. (zi; 0) in region 8). Then rm i does not
invest and xj = y
c
j . Now
i =
 
A  yci   ycj

yci   Viyci  Wizi  Ki:
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As yci increases by 2=3 and y
c
j decreases by =3, we obtain

new
i  i =

A  yci   ycj  

3

(yci +
2
3
)  (Vi  )(yci +
2
3
)
   A  yci   ycj yci + Viyci  zi
= 

4
3
yci +
4
9
  zi

.
Thus, there will be an improvement in prot oset by a term zi which arises from the fact that not
all the capacity built is used (in this region rm i has an excess capacity endowment). Provided this
excess capacity is not too great, then overall prots will improve.
The reduction in size of the region 6[8 is mainly associated with changing particular scenarios
from 8 to 10. If (zi; 0) is moved to 10 as a result of moving a cost  from Vi to Wi, then at
the production stage rm i moves from an environment with a competitor present to one without a
competitor. Moreover production costs are decreased. Without doing the detailed calculations it is
easy to see that there is an improvement in prot for rm i, again oset by a term zi related to the
extra costs of capacity that is not used.
There may also be a change in prot if (zi; 0) is at a point which moves from 8 to 6 as the
boundary changes. Then

new
i  i =
 
A  zi   SLj (zi)

zi   (Vi  )zi  
 
A  yci   ycj

yci + Viy
c
i  zi
=
1
2
zi (3y
c
i +Wj   zi)  (yci )2
Observe that this expression is positive when zi = y
c
i but becomes negative for zi large enough. This
completes the proof. 
Proof of Remark 4. We want to compare the overall prots arising from holdback and clearance.
The two dierent environments may produce very similar results. From a comparison of Theorems 2
and 3, we can see that for cases (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2 the results with clearance are qualitatively
similar to those with holdback. Dierences arise when one or both rms have an excess capacity
endowment at the start of the capacity game. To make the discussion more concrete suppose that
rm i is an entrant with zi = 0 and rm j is an incumbent with zj > #i. Moreover for simplicity
we will assume that there are no xed costs so Ki = Kj = 0. For holdback production, provided
si(zj) > 0, we are in case (iii) and rm i invests up to y
c
i and the incumbent rm does not invest
(note that when Ki = 0, we have s
B
i = y
c
i and so the condition si(zj) > 0 will usually hold). In the
production game rm i produces yci and rm j produces y
c
j . This gives a prot to the entering rm i
of
(A  yci   ycj   Vi  Wi)yci = (yci  Wi)yci
The prot to the incumbent rm j is
(A  yci   ycj   Vj)ycj =
 
ycj
2
. (A6)
35
Now consider clearance production. There are two cases. If sLi (zj) > 0 then the entering rm invests
an amount SLi (zj) otherwise rm i does not enter. The condition for entering can be written as
zj < A  Vi  Wi. In this case the entering rm gets a prot of
(A  SLi (zj)  zj   Vi  Wi)SLi (zj) =

A  Vi  Wi   zj
2
2
Since zj > #i the prot made is less than (y
c
i  Wi)yci ; in other words, with clearance the entering rm
makes less prot than with holdback. This is true also when the rm does not enter (making zero
prot under clearance).
Now consider the incumbent rm: since SLi (zj) < y
c
i in this region, rm i always produces less
than under holdback. Hence the prot to rm j were it to produce ycj is greater than the prot (A6)
under holdback production. Thus its prot from optimizing its production amount is also higher. This
completes the proof. 
Proof of Remarks 5 and 6. First, we assume that the rms employ clearance in production (we
will use the notation jL to indicate clearance). This game obviously degenerates into the standard
Stackelberg duopoly with the equilibrium outcomes, xi jL = (A W ) =2 and xj

L
= (A W ) =4, both
of which are positive from Assumption 2. The equilibrium prots are
i jL = (A W )2 =8 and j

L
= (A W )2 =16.
And, we can see i jL = 2 j

L
.
For the sake of comparison, the rms are now assumed to employ holdback in production (we will
use the notation jB to indicate holdback). As before, Assumption 2 holds in the following analysis.
Solving this problem backwards, we rst consider rm j's decision given rm i's investment amount
of xi. Theorem 1 tells us that for K = 0 such that s () = S (), rm j's best response of capacity
investment over xi is
xj (xi)

B
=
(
SL (xi) for xi  #
yc otherwise.
Note that SL (xi) > 0 because S
L (#) > 0 (i.e. Assumption 2 rules out the trivial case where SL (x) < 0
for x < #). Substituting this into rm i's decision problem, we obtain rm i's prot function:
max
xi0
i (xi)jB =
(
P
 
xi + S
L (xi)

xi  Wxi = (A W   xi)xi=2 for xi  #
P (2yc) yc  Wxi = A2=9 Wxi otherwise.
Solving this, we obtain an equilibrium outcome:
xi jB = # = A W   2
p
A (A  3W )=3 > yc, and
xj

B
= SL (#) = (A  # W ) =2 =pA (A  3W )=3 < yc,
where xi jB  xj

B
since xi jB xj

B
= A W pA (A  3W )  0 since (A W )2 hpA (A  3W )i2 =
(A+W )W  0. The equilibrium prots are
i jB =

A W  p4A (A=3 W ) =3p4A (A=3 W ) =3
2
and j

B
=
A (A  3W )
9
.
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We can see i jB > j

B
> 0 from above.
In this sequential investment game, the leader has a rst mover advantage and can predict that
if its own capacity investment is at # or more, the potential entrant will invest up to yc and then
push all capacity into the market to force the leader to hold back some capacity. If this happens, the
competition outcome is the standard Cournot duopoly and the leader would not gain any benet by
moving earlier. This is why the leader will choose to invest in capacity at a level #.
By the following facts:
xi jL > xi jB > yc > xj

B
> xj

L
and
i jL > i jB > j

B
> j

L
> 0,
we see that in the alternating decision scheme, holdback production weakens the commitment capa-
bility of preemptive capacity expansion (because xj

B
> xj

L
and j

B
> j

L
) but the clearance
strategies strengthens the commitment (because xi jL > xi jB and i jL > i jB), as in the simultane-
ous decision scheme. Note that in the sequential setting with holdback, the leading rm invests more
than the Cournot outcome of yc and the following rm invests less than yc. Therefore, the rst-mover
advantage still exists in the sequential investment game with holdback. 
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